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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over the appeal and cross-appeal herein pursuant to 
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-2-2(3)0'), 78-2-2(4), and 78-2a-3(2)G). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the District Court erred in failing to conclude that the Plaintiffs 
failure to list any interest in the contract at issue in this case in his bankruptcy statements 
and schedules deprived the Court of jurisdiction to award damages to the Plaintiff herein. 
Standard of Review: Resolution of a question of federal law by the District Court 
is a legal question which this Court reviews for correctness. See, e.g., State v. Jones, 958 
P.2d 938 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
2. Whether the District Court erred in failing to enforce the oral 
modifications in the written contract of the parties based on a misapplication of the 
statute of frauds. 
Standard of Review: Application of the statute of frauds is a question of law 
which this Court reviews for correctness. Spears v. Warr, 44 P.3d 742, 751 (Utah 2002). 
3. Whether the District Court erred in awarding the Plaintiff prejudgment 
interest on the amount of the judgment awarded to the Plaintiff. 
Standard of Review: The District Court's award of prejudgment interest is 
reviewed by this Court for correctness. Smith v. Fairfax Realty, Inc., 82 P.3d 1064 (Utah 
2002). 
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4. Whether the District Court erred in failing to determine that the Plaintiffs 
breach of his contract with the Defendants defeats his claim to further payments under 
the contract. 
Standard of Review: Whether a particular breach of contract is material is a 
conclusion of law to be reviewed by this Court for correctness. See Saunders v. Sharp, 
840 P.2d 796, 806 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
5. Whether the District Court erred in failing to enforce the warranty that the 
physician accounts would be willing to pay a six percent commission for the entire term 
of the Combined Agreement. 
Standard of Review: The District Court's interpretation of an unambiguous 
contract provision is reviewed for correctness. Interwest Construction v. Palmer, 923 
P.2d 1350 (Utah 1996). 
6. Whether the District Court erred in finding that Plaintiff, David Orlob, 
was entitled to 50 percent of the commissions payable. 
Standard of Review: The District Court's findings of fact are reviewed for clear 
error. Surge v. Facio, 88 P.2d 350, 352 (Utah Ct. App. 2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves a contract dispute among the parties to a written contract. 
(Addendum A; R. 49-59.) Pursuant to that contract, all of the assets of Professional's 
Control Group, Inc. ("PCG"), a physicians billing service, were sold to the Defendants 
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herein on August 31, 1988. At the time of the sale, the Plaintiff was the President and 
sole shareholder of PCG. (Addendum C, Finding of Fact No. 1, Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, R. 779.) The contract provided for certain payments to be made by 
the Defendants collectively to Plaintiff and to Professional's Control Group, Inc. 
("PGC"), the Plaintiffs corporation. (R. 49 - 52.) Ultimately, the United States Internal 
Revenue Service seized any interest of PCG in the contract and sold it to the Defendants 
herein; thereafter, the Defendants made no further payments under the contract to the 
Defendant. (R. 782) The Plaintiff then brought this action seeking, inter alia, a 
declaratory judgment that the Plaintiff had some interest in the contract which was not 
extinguished by the IRS sale, and money damages. (Complaint, R. 1; Amended 
Complaint, R. 41-61.) 
The District Court granted the Defendants' motion for summary judgment herein 
on the basis that any interest owned by the Plaintiff in the contract was extinguished by 
the IRS sale (R.892-894), and the Plaintiff appealed. (R. 895). The Utah Court of 
Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that the Plaintiff had "an individual interest in 
the Combined Agreement separate and distinct from PCG's interest. His interest arises 
from the personal covenants he made to assist with the orderly transfer and maintenance 
of accounts and not to compete with" the Defendants. Orlob v. Wasatch Management, 
33 P.3d 1078, 1082 (Utah Ct. App. 2001). 
After trial on remand, the District Court concluded that the Plaintiff (1) had an 
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interest in 50 percent of all sums owing but unpaid under the contract, flowing from his 
individual covenants to assist in the transfer and maintenance of accounts and not to 
compete with the Defendants; (2) that the Plaintiff breached his warranty to deliver Dr. 
Hamilton as a physician willing to pay a 6 percent commission, and that a reduction in 
the amount payable to the Plaintiff was appropriate; (3) that the Plaintiff breached his 
covenant to assist in the transfer and maintenance of accounts as to certain Payson, Utah, 
physicians, but that such breach did not vitiate the Defendants' obligation to make 
commission payments to the Plaintiff; (4) that the Plaintiff breached his covenant not to 
compete as to Dr. Peterson, but that the Defendants had elected a remedy reducing the 
monthly commission payments payable to Plaintiff; (5) that certain oral modifications to 
the contract asserted by the Defendants were barred by the Statute of Frauds; (6) that 
"after calculating all reductions, offsets, and credits" in favor of the Defendants, the 
amount owing to the Plaintiff each month is "readily ascertainable as a mathematical 
proposition and, therefore, Plaintiff is entitled to pre-judgment interest" (Addendum C, 
Conclusions of Law No. 7; R. 1641); and (7) that the Combined Agreement contained a 
"warranty" by Plaintiff that the "accounts" being transferred would "be willing to pay 6% 
of total collections for services rendered." (Addendum A, Combined Agreement, R. 51; 
Addendum C, Conclusions of Law No. 2, R. 1639.) However, the District Court refused 
to enforce the warranty for any periods after the first day of the warranty even though the 
contract was for six years. 
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This appeal by the Defendants followed. (R. 1654). The Plaintiff filed a cross-
appeal "to the extent that [the judgment] etwards the Plaintiff only one-half of the 
amounts due by the Defendants under the contract. . ." . (R. 1656.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The Plaintiff David L. Orlob, in approximately 1979, started a physicians 
billing service known as Professional's Control Group. (Addendum C, Findings of Fact1 
No. 1;R. 1632.) 
2. In December, 1984, Plaintiff incorporated Professional's Control Group 
as Professional's Control Group, Inc. ("PCG"), a Utah corporation. (Addendum C, FF 
No.2;R. 1632.) 
3. Defendant Wasatch Medical Management was, at all material times, a 
partnership consisting of defendants Kenneth C. Jensen, Earlene B. Jensen, Steven K. 
Jensen, and Keven J. Jensen. Prior to August 1, 1988, the Jensens operated a physician's 
billing service primarily in the Ogden area. (Addendum C, FF No. 3; R. 1632.) 
4. During 1987 and the first part of 1988, the Jensens desired to enter the 
Salt Lake valley market to provide physician billing services. During that time, PCG 
provided service to between 30 percent to 35 percent of the anesthesiology market in the 
hereinafter cited as "FF" where reference is made to a Finding of Fact; the trial court's 
Conclusions of Law will hereinafter be cited as "CL." 
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Salt Lake valley, as well as some physicians in Logan and in Payson, Utah. (Addendum 
C,FFNo.4;R. 1632.) 
5. At that time, PCG provided those billing services to physicians at the rate 
of 6 percent of collections. (Addendum C, FF No. 5; R. 1632.) 
6. When the Jensens attempted to enter the Salt Lake market, they contacted 
a number of anesthesiologists, some of whom were then clients of PCG, and offered 
billing services at 4 percent. (Addendum C, FF No. 6; R. 1633.) 
7. The Jensens efforts led at least three of PCG's clients to leave PCG, and at 
least one other had given notice of leaving. (Addendum C, FF No. 7; R. 1633; FF No. 13, 
R. 1634.) 
8. The Plaintiff approached the Jensens, advised them that he was interested 
in selling PCG and leaving the Salt Lake area, and inquired into their interest in 
purchasing PCG. (Addendum C, FF No. 8; R. 1633.) 
9. After negotiations, the parties agreed to a purchase and sale, and entered 
into a contract titled "Combined Agreement," executed August 31, 1988, and effective as 
of the same date. (Addendum C, FF No. 9; R. 1633.) 
10. The contract calls for payments to "Orlob2" in the sum of $7,500.00 per 
month, calculated at 1-1/2 percent of prior billings for the "accounts" then under contract. 
The $7,500.00 was to be reduced at the rate of 1-1/2 percent of the average billing for 
2All references to "Orlob" in the Combined Agreement refer collectively to Professional's 
Control Group and to the Plaintiff Orlob. (R. 49). 
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any physician account that subsequently terminated its billing services, unless the parties 
were able to retain "replacement physicians." (R. 51.) 
11. Paragraph 5 of the contract provides: 
5. For commissions paid and profits shared Orlob warrants that he 
will assist in the orderly transfer of all accounts to Jensens and assist 
Jensens to maintain the accounts over the life of this Agreement" 
{Addendum A, R. 50.) (Emphasis added.) 
12. Paragraph 8 of the contract provides in pertinent part: 
"8. For Orlob's assistance in the transfer and maintenance of 
accounts listed on Schedule "B" Jensens shall pay to Orlob a 
commission. . . . Orlob warrants that all listed anesthesiologists 
accounts must be willing to pay 6% of total collections for services 
rendered, (emphasis supplied). 
{Addendum A, R. 50-51.) 
13. The "accounts" that were to be transferred and maintained by Orlob were 
"accounts receivable management agreements" between the corporate entity, PCG, and 
the respective doctors. {Addendum Z), R. 1681, Trial Tr. 110:7-111:10.) All such 
contracts allowed termination on either 30 or 90 day notice. {Addendum C, FF No. 13; R. 
1634.) 
14. The contract also states: "Orlob further agrees and warrants he will not 
compete directly or indirectly in Utah against or adverse to Ihe Jensens in the billing and 
collection business for a period often years commencing August 1, 1988." {Addendum 
A, R. 50; Addendum C, FF No. 11, R. 1633-3.) 
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15. The Jensens repeatedly requested that the Plaintiff introduce them to 
physicians as the new owners of the company. The Plaintiff refused to do so, and 
attempted to persuade the Jensens that they should represent themselves as new members 
of management rather than their true character as owners. Plaintiff argued that if doctors 
who previously had been offered billing at 4 percent by the Jensens learned that the 
Jensens were the new owners of the company, it would affect their willingness to 
continue on their contracts to pay 6 percent. The Jensens then advised at least one such 
doctor that they were the new owners of the company, after which a number of 
anesthesiologists threatened to terminate their contracts. Thereafter, the Jensens 
negotiated reductions in the billing rates for those doctors from six percent to five 
percent. From that time forward, the relationship between the Jensens and the Plaintiff 
deteriorated. {Addendum C, FFNo. 15; R. 1635.) 
16. The Plaintiff breached his obligation to deliver Dr. Hamilton as a 
physician willing to pay a six percent commission to the Jensens. Dr. Hamilton had 
already sent a letter terminating his six percent contract at the time the Combined 
Agreement was executed. Ultimately, Dr. Hamilton did not terminate as his letter stated 
he would, based upon the efforts of the Jensens to renegotiate his contract. The 
commission payable by Dr. Hamilton was reduced from six percent to five percent as of 
May, 1999. {Addendum C, FF No. 16; R. 1635.) 
17. The Combined Agreement provides for a reduction in commissions 
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payable to the Plaintiff in the event physicians terminate their services for any reason. 
However, it is also provided that "in the event Jensens and/or Orlob are able to persuade 
other replacement anesthesiologists to subscribe to Jensens' services during the 
commission period the percentages and ceilings shall be replaced to the to extent that 
Orlob shall receive $7,500 per month in the form of commissions." (Addendum A, 
Combined Agreement, R. 51.) 
18 Dr. Peterson departed from the Jensens' services to have his billing 
services performed by an associate of Plaintiff. As such, the Plaintiff breached his 
personal covenant not to compete directly or indirectly with respect to Dr. Peterson. 
(Addendum C, FF 19; R. 1637 - 38.) 
19. The Jensens, properly made deduction in the sum of $801.93 per month 
from commission payments otherwise payable to the Plaintiff because of the breach 
regarding Dr. Peterson.. (Addendum C, FF 20; R. 1638.) 
21. On or about October 1, 1990, the United States Department of the 
Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, served a notice of levy upon the Jensens concerning 
taxes owed by PCG. The Jensens made no payment to the Plaintiff for the commission 
payment due October 15, 1990, or thereafter. (Addendum C, FF 21; R. 1638.) 
22. The IRS held a public auction on December 10, 1990, at which it sold the 
right, title and interest of PCG in and to the Combined Agreement. The Jensens were the 
successful bidder at the auction and purchased the PCG interest in the Combined 
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Agreement. (Addendum C, FF 22; R. 1638.) Whether any interest of the Plaintiff, 
individually, in the Combined Agreement was extinguished by the IRS seizure and sale 
of the interest of PCG was decided by the Utah Court of Appeals in Orlob v. Wasatch 
Management, 33 P.3d 1078, 1082 (Utah Ct. App. 2001), adversely to the Defendants. 
The Court of Appeals held that the Plaintiffs individual "interest arises from the personal 
covenants he made to assist with the orderly transfer and maintenance of accounts and 
not to compete with" the Defendants. Id. The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the 
District Court to determine the extent of the Plaintiffs individual interest. The District 
Court concluded that the Combined Agreement does not state whether or how the 
commission payment should be divided between PCG and the Plaintiff, and found that, in 
the absence of any instruction in the contract, the Plaintiff was entitled to one-half of the 
commission payments. (Addendum C, FF 23; R. 1639.) 
23. PCG, whose assets were purchased by Jensens at IRS auction, was the 
owner of all accounts with the doctors. (Addendum £>, R. 1681, Trial Tr. 110:7-111:10.) 
24. The Plaintiff commenced this case by filing a Complaint with the Third 
Judicial District Court on February 14, 1991, asserting money damages of "not less than 
$60,000.00." (R. 1 - 3.) 
25 In 1992, the year following his commencement of this case, the Plaintiff 
filed a voluntary petition under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code with the United States 
Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California, Case No. LA 92-30472AG. The 
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Plaintiff received a discharge in the bankruptcy case on September 18, 1992. 
(Addendum D, R. 1681, Trial Tr., June 25, 2002, 155:16-18; Addendum G, Trial Exh. 31, 
pp. 3, 59.) Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint in the instant case three and one half 
months after his discharge in bankruptcy raising his demand from $60,000.00 to "in no 
event not less than 450,000.00," but did not amend or reopen his bankruptcy case to even 
mention the claim. 
26. In the bankruptcy case, 1he Plaintiff filed his financial statement and 
schedules on June 4, 1992, and signed those documents under penalty of perjury. 
(Addendum G, Trial Exh. 31, p. 29, 30) Question 4 of the Plaintiffs Statement of 
Financial Affairs required the Debtor to "list all suits to which the debtor is or was a party 
within one year immediately preceding the filing of this bankruptcy case." The Plaintiff 
lists a number of actions against him, but does not identify the instant case against the 
Jensens which was then pending in the Third Judicial District Court. (Addendum D, R. 
1681, Trial Tr., June 25, 2002, 143:18-22; 144:22-25; Addendum G, Trial Exh. 31, p. 21.) 
On Schedule B, which required that the Plaintiff disclose "other contingent and 
unliquidated claims of every nature, including tax refunds, counterclaims of the debtor, 
and right to set off claims, the Plaintiff reported "None." (Addendum G, Trial Exh. 31, p. 
33.) Additionally, on Schedule B, which required that the Plaintiff disclose "stock and 
interests in incorporated and unincorporated businesses," the Plaintiff reported "None." 
(Addendum G, Trial Exh. 31, p. 33.) On Schedule G, which required that the Plaintiff 
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disclose any executory contracts, the Plaintiff reported "None." (Addendum G, Trial 
Exh. 31, p. 43.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The trial court erred in failing to conclude that the Plaintiff s failure to 
list any interest in the contract in his bankruptcy statements and schedules deprived the 
Court of jurisdiction to award damages to the Plaintiff herein. 
The Plaintiffs failure to disclose the existence of his causes of action and his 
ownership interest in PCG in his bankruptcy case deprives him of standing and 
jurisdiction to pursue his claims against the Defendants in the courts of Utah. 
2. The trial court erred in failing to enforce the oral modifications in the 
written contract of the parties in purported violation of the statute of fraud, despite the 
fact that the agreement could have been performed within one year. 
The Plaintiffs obligations under the Combined Agreement could all have been 
performed within one year and the oral modifications to the contract by the parties did 
not violate the Statute of Frauds. 
3. The trial court erred in failing to determine that the Plaintiffs breaches of 
his contract with the Defendants was material and excused the Defendants from any 
further performance. 
Because the Plaintiffs breaches of the Combined Agreement were all matters 
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which would have been of "some importance" to the Defendants in determining whether 
to enter into the Combined Agreement at all, those breaches were material and excused 
any further performance by the Defendants herein. 
4. The trial court erred in awarding the Plaintiff prejudgment interest on the 
amount of the judgment. 
Even assuming that the Plaintiff is entitled to damages herein, the calculation of 
such damages is not possible to a "mathematical certainty" and thus the award of 
prejudgment interest was erroneous. 
5. The trial court erred in refusing to enforce the written warranty that the 
listed accounts must be willing to pay 6 percent of total collections for services rendered 
over the life of the contract. 
The warranty should be enforced pursuant to its terms and the parties' 
understanding of those terms. Merely because the warranty may have placed a 
substantial burden on the Plaintiff does not justify the District Court's refusal to enforce 
it. 
6. The trial court erred in finding that Plaintiff, David Or lob, was entitled to 
50 percent of commissions payable. 
There is no evidence in the record from which the Court made this factual finding 
and it is, therefore, clearly erroneous and must be reversed. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONCLUDE 
THAT THE PLAINTIFF'S FAILURE TO LIST ANY 
INTEREST IN THE CONTRACT IN HIS BANKRUPTCY 
STATEMENTS AND SCHEDULES DEPRIVED THE 
COURT OF JURISDICTION TO AWARD DAMAGES TO 
THE PLAINTIFF HEREIN. 
On May 22, 1992, after the filing of his original Complaint herein seeking 
damages of "not less than $60,000.00" (R. 1) and prior to filing his Amended Complaint 
herein seeking damages of "in no event less than $450,000.00" (R. 41 -61), the Plaintiff, 
David Orlob, filed a voluntary Chapter 7 petition in bankruptcy in the United States 
Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California. (Addendum G, Tr. Exh. 31.) 
Therein, despite his ongoing knowledge of the litigation in this case, he (1) failed to 
disclose in his Statements and Schedules the existence of the instant case; (2) failed to 
disclose on Schedule B his claim against the Defendants herein; (3) failed to disclose on 
Schedule G the existence of the contract herein; and (4) failed to disclose his stock 
ownership of PCG. (Addendum G, Tr. Exh. 31 at 22, 33, 43, 59). He then signed his 
Statement of Financial Affairs under penalty of perjury. (Addendum G, Tr. Exh. 31 at 
29.) 
After the trustee in the bankruptcy case reported to the Bankruptcy Court that the 
case was a "no asset" case (Addendum G, Tr. Exh. 31 at 2), the Debtor was granted a 
discharge from his debts on September 18, 1992. (Addendum G. Tr. Exh. 31 at 3.) Such 
failures to disclose have been held in numerous bankruptcy cases to be a fraud upon the 
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court. See, e.g., Tenn-Fla Partners v. First Union National Bank (In re Tenn-Fla 
Partners), 226 F.2d 746 (6th Cir. 2000); In re V&MManagement, Inc., 215 B.R. 895 
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1997); In re Michaelson, 141 B.R. 715, 716 (Bankr. E. D. Cal. 1992). 
The Defendants submit that federal bankruptcy law establishes that the claims, if 
any, belong to the bankruptcy estate, not to Mr. Orlob. Because Mr. Orlob failed to 
disclose any interest related to ownership of his contract claims in the bankruptcy 
proceeding he filed in California in 1992, the Plaintiff may not prevail in this case as a 
matter of law. 
In deciding the issues, the Court need not address any matter outside the facts 
contained in the bankruptcy statements and schedules Plaintiff Orlob filed in his 
bankruptcy case. Notably, the Plaintiff filed the instant case in 1991, prior to filing his 
bankruptcy case, and went on to vigorously pursue his claims against the Defendants 
after receiving his discharge. Yet in the bankruptcy case, the Plaintiff sought to conceal 
his interest in any of the contract claims he now asserts entitle him to damages. His 
failure to report those claims to the Bankruptcy Court and to his creditors was not the 
result of mere oversight or inadvertence as evidenced by the facts that (a) he 
acknowledged at trial that his reason for filing for bankruptcy was "[b]ecause the 
payments had stopped coming from the Jensens . . .". {Addendum D, R. 1681, Trial Tr. 
141:11.); (b) his lawsuit was already pending against the Jensens asking for $60,000.00 
when he filed his schedules in the bankruptcy; and (c) he amended his complaint in this 
15 
case within three and one half months of his discharge in bankruptcy in his "no asset" 
case to raise his demand from $60,000.00 to $450,000.00. (Amended Complaint, R. 41-
61.) 
All of the Plaintiffs claims herein are predicated on his alleged rights under the 
Combined Agreement. Accordingly, an essential element of each and every claim 
asserted by the Plaintiff is that he has standing and the ability to claim rights against the 
Defendants under that Agreement. As discussed below, and as a matter of law, the 
Plaintiff has no standing to assert claims under the Agreement because he failed to 
schedule or disclose his alleged interest in the Combined Agreement in his bankruptcy 
case. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court herein should be reversed. 
A. THE PLAINTIFF HAS NO STANDING TO 
ASSERT HIS CLAIMS AGAINST DEFENDANTS 
AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
(1) The Plaintiffs Rights Under the Combined Agreement 
Were Property of the Bankruptcy Estate in the 
Plaintiffs Chapter 7 Case. 
The commencement of a bankruptcy case divests a debtor from all of his pre-
petition property rights and transfers such property by operation of law into the 
bankruptcy "estate" for administration in accordance with federal bankruptcy law. See 
11 U.S.C. § 541, which provides in relevant part as follows: 
(a) The commencement of [a bankruptcy case] creates an estate. Such 
estate is comprised of all of the following property, wherever located 
and by whomever held: 
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(1) Except as provided in [inapplicable 
provisions] all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in 
property as of the commencement of the bankruptcy case. 
11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1). Section 541 also provides that funds generated by pre-petition 
contract or other pre-petition right are property of the estate even if such funds are not 
paid until the filing of the bankruptcy case. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(6) (which provides 
that property of the estate includes "[p]roceeds, product, offspring, rents, or profits of or 
from property of the estate, except as are earnings from services performed by an 
individual debtor after the commencement of the case"). 
For example, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that a lawyer debtor's 
rights to payment under a pre-petition contingent fee contract are property of the 
bankruptcy estate, even if payment under the contract does not occur until after the 
bankruptcy case is filed. See In re Jess, 169 F.3d 1204 (9th Cir. 1999). In that case, an 
attorney executed a contingent fee agreement with a client. After executing the 
agreement, but before being entitled to payment thereunder, the attorney filed for 
bankruptcy relief. After filing the bankruptcy, the attorney received payment under the 
contract; and he asserted that his right to payment under the contract was not property of 
the bankruptcy estate. Jess, 169 F.2d at 1206-07. The Ninth Circuit directly rejected the 
lawyer debtor's argument and held that, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) and (6), his 
right to payment under a pre-petition contingent fee contract is property of his estate 
regardless of when payment under the contract is actually made. 
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Jess, 169 F.3d at 1207-08 (quoting In re Wu, 173 B.R. 411, 414-15 (9th Cir. BAP 1994. 
See also United States v. Messner, 107 F.3d 1448 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that although 
property not owned by the debtor until after filing of the bankruptcy petition is generally 
not included in the bankruptcy estate, an exception exists for after-acquired property 
comprised of proceeds of the estate property). 
In this case, it is indisputable that Plaintiffs alleged right to payment pursuant to 
the Combined Agreement was property of the estate in his Bankruptcy Case. The 
Combined Agreement was entered into in August, 1988, prior to the Plaintiffs 1992 
bankruptcy filing. Plaintiff claims that payments were due under the Combined 
Agreement both pre- and post-petition. Virtually every activity which Plaintiff allegedly 
performed in conjunction with the Agreement was performed before the filing of the 
bankruptcy petition; the Plaintiff did not cite at trial even a single example of any service 
performed by him under the Agreement after the date of the bankruptcy filing. Indeed, 
he testified (a) that he did nothing to bring in any "replacement doctors" for those who 
terminated their billing service contracts (Addendum E, R. 1682, Trial Tr. 109:20 - 110:1) 
(the Court of Appeals in the earlier appeal herein held that the Plaintiff, David Orlob, had 
rights in the Combined Agreement based on his obligations to not compete and to assist 
in the transfer and maintenance of the accounts); (b) that the covenant not to compete 
contained in the Combined Agreement had no value to him (Addendum E. R.1682, Trial 
Tr. 128:20 -129:4); (c) that he did nothing at all after six months following the execution 
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of the combined agreement to assist with the transfer or maintenance of the accounts. 
{Addendum D, R. 1681, Trial Tr. 136:21:25 - 137:21.) Nor does the Plaintiff dispute that 
the Defendants actually performed all of the activity which resulted in the recovery of 
fees under the contracts with the physicians. The Plaintiff alleges that he is entitled to 
additional payments under the contract because of the terms of a Combined Agreement 
that existed and was fully matured at the time the Agreement was executed, and asserts 
his entitlement to fees even if the Defendetnts performed all of the activity in connection 
with the recovery of fees from the physician clients, as they did. 
In short, given the Plaintiffs own testimony, his alleged right to payment under 
the Agreement arose before his bankruptcy filing. Therefore, it was property of his 
bankruptcy estate. 
In light of the foregoing, and under the precedent of the above-cited case law and 
statutes, the Plaintiffs alleged rights under the Agreement were property of his 
bankruptcy estate as a matter of law. 
(2) The Plaintiff Had an Absolute Duty to Disclose and 
Schedule His Alleged Rights Under the Combined 
Agreement. 
One of the most fundamental obligations of a debtor in bankruptcy is to disclose 
and schedule in the bankruptcy case all property of the estate. See 11 U.S.C. §521(1) 
(which requires a debtor to file schedules of all assets and liabilities). See also Oneida 
Motor Freight, Inc. v. United Jersey Bank, 848 F.2d 414, 416 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. 
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denied, 488 U.S. 967 (1988) ("A longstanding tenet of bankruptcy law requires one 
seeking benefits under its terms to satisfy a companion duty to schedule, for the benefit 
of creditors, all his interests and property rights"3.) 
Despite this affirmative duty to disclose and schedule all of his properly rights, 
Plaintiff Orlob did not disclose or schedule any interest in the Combined Agreement or 
any alleged rights he held thereunder in his bankruptcy case. In fact, based upon the 
Plaintiffs bankruptcy filings, the Plaintiff essentially alleged that he held no valuable 
non-exempt assets of any kind, and the Trustee thus reported the case to the Bankruptcy 
Court as a "no asset" case. Plaintiffs sworn statement in the bankruptcy schedules that 
his was a "no asset" case cannot be reconciled with the fact that the Plaintiff now asserts 
that the "pre-petition" Combined Agreement entitles him to a substantial money 
judgment. 
(3) Because the Plaintiff Did Not Schedule His Alleged 
Rights Under the Combined Agreement in his Chapter 
7 Bankrutpcy Case. No Rights in the Combined 
Agreement Could Re-Vest in the Plaintiff Orlob After 
the Closing of the Bankruptcy Case. 
Property of a Chapter 7 bankruptcy estate does not revest in the debtor unless the 
3In a Chapter 7 case, a trustee is appointed who has exclusive title and authority over all 
property of the estate and the exclusive right to assert and enforce regarding such 
property. See 11 U.S.C. § § 323 and 704. See also/n re Benefield, 102 B.R. 157, 158-59 
(Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1989) ("When the [Chapter 7 bankruptcy] petition was filed the 
debtor's interest in property became property of the estate under the control of the 
trustee" irrespective of whether the debtor actually scheduled such property.") 
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property is "abandoned" to the debtor under 11 U.S.C. § 554. That section provides that 
if property is properly scheduled and disclosed by a debtor, the property can be deemed 
abandoned to the debtor at the closing of the bankruptcy case. See 11 U.S.C. § 554(c) 
(which provides, in relevant part, that "[u]nless the court orders otherwise, any property 
scheduled under section 521(1) of this title not otherwise administered at the time of the 
closing of a case is abandoned to the debtor . . .".) (Emphasis added.) Further, 11 U.S.C. 
§ 554(d) provides that if property is not scheduled or disclosed by the debtor, the 
property cannot be abandoned to or otherwise revest in the debtor and remains property 
of the estate even after the bankruptcy case is closed. See 11 U.S.C. §554(d) (which 
provides that unless property is abandoned through one of the procedures provided under 
subsections (a) through (c), the property "is not administered in the case and remains 
property of the estate.") (Emphasis added.) 
The courts have held uniformly that if a debtor fails to schedule property of the 
estate, the undisclosed property does not revest in the debtor at the closing of the 
bankruptcy case and the former debtor has no ownership or other interest in the property. 
See, e.g., In re Pace, 146 B.R. 562, 565-66 (9th Cir. BAP 1992) (property that is not 
scheduled by a debtor is not subject to deemed abandonment provision of Bankruptcy 
Code § 554(c) and remains property of the estate); Vreugdenhill v. Navistar International 
Transportation Corp., 950 F.2d 524, 526 (8th Cir. 1991) ("In order for property to be 
abandoned by operation of law pursuant to section 554(c), the debtor must formally 
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schedule the property before the close of the case. It is not enough that the Trustee learns 
of the property through other means; the property must be scheduled pursuant to section 
521(1)"); Jeffrey v. Desmond, 70 F.3d 183, 186 (1995) (same); Robinson v. J.A. Wiertal 
Construction, 185 A.D.2d 664, 665, 586 N.Y.S.2d 59, 60 (N.Y Ct. App. 1992) ("if a 
debtor fails to schedule an asset, the asset cannot be 'dealt with' during the bankruptcy 
and, therefore, title to the asset remains in the bankruptcy estate"); In re Benfield, 102 
B.R. 157, 159 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1989) (property of the estate not scheduled by a debtor 
cannot be deemed to be abandoned to the debtor and remains property of the estate after 
the bankruptcy is closed). 
Plaintiff did not schedule any of his alleged rights under the Combined Agreement 
in the bankruptcy case or even disclose his ownership of PCG. Accordingly, as a matter 
of law, none of the claims Plaintiff Orlob now alleges against the Defendants under the 
Combined Agreement ever revested in the Plaintiff at the close of the bankruptcy case. 
(4) Plainiff Orlob Has No Standing to Assert His Claims 
Against the Defendants. 
Because unscheduled property cannot revest in a debtor at the close of a 
bankruptcy case, the former debtor lacks standing and cannot pursue an action or 
otherwise asset rights based upon the asset after the bankruptcy case is closed. See, e.g., 
Stein v. United Artists Corp., 691 F.2d 885, 890-93 (9th Cir. 1982) (bankruptcy debtor 
that did not schedule an alleged cause of action in bankruptcy case had no title in and no 
standing or other ability to assert a cause of action after the closing of the bankruptcy 
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case); In re Pace, 159 B.R. 890, 899 (9th Cir. BAP 1993) ("parties asserting title to 
[causes of action not disclosed during a bankruptcy case] cannot enforce such claims 
because they cannot demonstrate abandonment by the trustee") (citing Stein)', Stanley v. 
Sherwin-Williams Co., 156 B.R. 25, 26-27 (W.D. Va. 1993) (complaint for interference 
with contractual relations dismissed for lack of standing because plaintiffs alleged cause 
of action was property of the estate in plaintiffs prior bankruptcy and was not scheduled 
in the bankruptcy); Robinson, 185 A.D. 2d at 665, 586 N.Y.S. 2d at 60 (same); Linklater 
v. Johnson, 768 P.2d 1020, 1022 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989) ("a discharged debtor lacks legal 
capacity to subsequently assert title to and pursue an unscheduled claim simply because a 
trustee, without knowledge of the claim, took no action with respect to it."); Krank v. 
Utica Mutual Insurance Co., 109 B.R. 668, 669 (E.D. Pa. 1990). 
For the foregoing reasons, the Plaintiff has no standing to pursue his alleged 
claims against the Defendants herein, and the District Court should have dismissed this 
case for lack of jurisdiction. Lack of standing is a jurisdictional issue which may be 
raised by a party at any time. See, e.g., Washington County Water Conservancy Dist. V. 
Morgan, 82 P.3d 1125, 1133 (Utah 2003); Salt Lake City Crop. v. Property Tax Division, 
979 P.2d 346, 350 (Utah 1999); Harris v. Springville City, 712 P.2d 188, 190 (Utah 
1984); Heath Tecna Corp. v. Sound Systems, Inc., 588 P.2d 169 (Utah 1978). 
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II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
ENFORCE THE ORAL MODIFICATIONS TO THE 
WRITTEN CONTRACT IN PURPORTED VIOLATION 
OF THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 
The District Court found that the physician accounts with PCG, the Plaintiffs 
corporation, were initially paying 6 percent of total collections for services rendered. 
(R.1632, 1634, Addendum C, FF 5, 13.) Jensens were doing business at 4 percent and 
had offered 4 percent to PCG's accounts, some of whom had already left PCG and joined 
Jensens. (R. 1633, Addendum C, FF 6.) 
The commissions payable to Plaintiff and PCG were calculated on the basis of a 6 
percent rate. Of the two percent difference between the four percent (for the Jensen 
clients) and the six percent (warranted by Orlob), the Orlob parties were to receive 1-1/2 
percent and Jensens would be entitled to a Vi percent share. Accordingly, Jensens would 
earn more on the transferred accounts than on their prior clients. However, this would 
only hold true if the assigned accounts remained at 6 percent. 
Soon after the Combined Agreement and the transfer of physician accounts the 
doctors on the listed accounts threatened to leave because of the difference in the rate 
they were paying and the rate available to the other Jensen clients. Rather than lose the 
relationship altogether Jensens negotiated a compromise reduction to 5 percent. 
{Addendum £>, R. 1681, 47:7-16; 77:7-12; 159:14-25 — 160:1-15) The Plaintiff agreed 
that because of the reductions, his commissions would be correspondingly reduced. The 
fact that the parties reached an understanding that payments to Plaintiff would be 
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reduced proportionately is soundly supported in the record. There was testimony at the 
trial that the parties orally agreed to a reduction in the commission payments payable 
from the Defendants to Plaintff Orlob from six to five percent. {Addendum E, R. 1682, 
Trial, 12:20-25 — 13:1-6.) There was further testimony that the Defendant orally agreed 
to a reduction in his commission with respect to certain Payson physicians. (Addendum 
E, R. 1682, Trial Tr. 53:23 - 54:9; 93:19-25; 94:1-6) Plaintiff David Orlob even told Lisa 
Stewart, one of his former employees, that he had agreed to a reduction in his 
commission because of the reduction to 5 percent with the accounts. {Addendum E, R. 
1682, Trial, 12:20-25 — 13:1-6.) 
The Plaintiff had very good motivation to agree to the reduction in commissions 
resulting from the reduced rate being paid by the assigned accounts. For example, the 
Plaintiff would get zero commissions from any assigned accounts which left the Jensens 
{Addendum A, Combined Agreement, f 9, R. 52). Moreover, Orlob provided a warranty 
that the accounts "must be willing to pay 6% of total collections for services rendered". 
Combined Agreement, TJ8, R. 51.) 
The oral agreement to modify the commissions reflecting the reduced rates from 
the accounts is merely the same result that the warranty would have required in any 
event. Unfortunately, and we believe erroneously, the Court determined as a matter of 
law, however, that these oral modifications to the contract would violate the Statute of 
Frauds. {Addendum C, R. 1641, CL 6.) The Court made no factual findings with respect 
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to this issue, but it appears that the underlying basis for the court's decision on the Statute 
of Frauds issue was a determination that the oral modification to the contract could not be 
performed within one year. 
In Utah, application of the Statute of Frauds, Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-4 (1988), 
only requires that contracts be reduced to writing where the contract is literally incapable 
of being performed within one year. In Pasquin v. Pasquin, 988 P.2d 1 (Utah App. 
1999), the plaintiff brought suit against the defendant claiming that she had an oral 
contract for lifetime employment and partnership in the defendant's business. The trial 
court had held as a matter of law that the purported agreements were incapable of 
performance within one year and were thus barred by the Statute of Frauds. This Court 
reversed, noting as follows: 
While the statute of frauds as a whole has been criticized frequently for 
fostering more fraud than it prevents, the one-year provision has suffered 
particularly harsh criticism, [citation omitted]. Consequently, as early as 
the mid-1600s, English courts began to construe the statute of frauds as a 
whole, and the one-year clause in particular, [citation omitted.] This early 
tendency to narrow the application of the one-year provision led to the rule 
that the words "not to be performed within one year" should be construed 
very liberally. The courts have interpreted those words to encompass any 
agreement that could not possibly be performed within one year, without 
regard to the parties' intentions or the actual subsequent course of events, 
[citation omitted.] 
Pasquin at 5. 
As noted by the Pasquin court, the United States Supreme Court adopted this 
interpretation as early as the late nineteenth century. See, e.g., Warner v. Texas & Pac. 
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Ry Co., 164 U.S. 418 (1896) ("The question is not what the probable, or expected, or 
actual performance of the contract was; but whether the contract, according to the 
reasonable interpretation of its terms, required that it should not be performed within the 
year.") 
In Pasquin, the Court of Appeals held that, because the contract was capable of 
performance in less than a year, since the plaintiff might have died during that time, the 
Statute of Frauds had no application. In the earlier appeal in this case this Court of 
Appeals held that Mr. Orlob, personally, had rights under the Combined Agreement 
because of his covenant against competition and his obligation to assist in the transfer 
and maintenance of the accounts. Each of these positions is personal to Mr. Orlob and 
would be lost in the event of his death within one year. Thus, under the holding in 
Pasquin, because the Plaintiff might have died before the expiration of one year, the 
Statute of Frauds has no applicability and the trial court should not have rejected the oral 
modification to the Combined Agreement on that basis. 
In Zion 's Service Corp. v. Danielson, 366 P.2d 982 (Utah 1961), the Utah 
Supreme Court was faced with facts that are also relevant to this case. In Zion's Service 
The Court held that a contract entered into by the individual members of an incorporated 
trade association was not barred by the one-year clause because each member of the 
corporation was free to leave at any time. Accordingly, the agreement was capable of 
performance within one year. 
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In the instant case the oral agreements reached with Orlob to reduce his 
commission payments for physicians who negotiated a lower rate of payment could be 
performed within one year. This is so because each of the physician agreements could be 
terminated by them within 30 or 90 days, depending on the form of the contract. 
Consequently, it is clear that each of the oral modifications to the contract was capable of 
being performed in one year. 
For these reasons, because the contract was literally capable of being performed 
within one year, the Statute of Frauds has no applicability in this case and the trial court 
should have determined that the Combined Agreement was modified to provide for 
commission payments to the Plaintiff based on reduced percentages of collections. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
DETERMINE THAT THE PLAINTIFF'S BREACHES 
OF HIS CONTRACT WITH THE DEFENDANTS 
WERE MATERIAL AND EXCUSED THE 
DEFENDANTS FROM ANY FURTHER 
PERFORMANCE. 
The trial court, despite expressly finding that the Plaintiff was in breach of the 
Combined Agreement in a number of respects, nevertheless declined to determine that 
the Plaintiffs breaches excused the Defendants' further performance under the contract. 
The Court made no express factual findings with respect to whether the Plaintiffs 
breaches of the contract either were or were not material. But the Court did find that the 
Plaintiff breached his covenant not to compete with the Defendants by assisting a third 
party to compete for billing services with respect to Dr. Peterson {Addendum C, R. 1637-
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38, FF 19, 20, CL 4); found that Orlob further breached his covenant to deliver Dr. 
Hamilton to the Defendants as a physician who was willing to pay a six percent 
commission (Addendum C, R. 1639, CL 2); and found that Orlob further breached his 
covenant to assist in the transfer and maintenance of accounts to the extent that he did not 
introduce the Jensens to certain Payson physicians. (Addendum C, R. 1640, CL 3.) 
As to Dr. Peterson, the Court concluded that the Plaintiffs had reduced the 
commission payable to the Plaintiff as the result of losing Dr. Peterson, and had thus 
"elected" that reduction as their sole remedy. (Addendum C, R. 1640, CL 4.) 
As to Dr. Hamilton, the Court concluded that the only appropriate remedy was a 
commission reduction in the monthly amount payable to the Plaintiff. (Addendum C, R. 
1640, CL 2.) 
As to the Payson physicians, the Court concluded that the Plaintiffs breach "was 
not sufficient to vitiate the obligation to make commission payments under the Combined 
Agreement." (Addendum C, R. 1640, CL 3.) However, Orlob testified that reducing fees 
to four percent of collections would result in operating losses. (Addendum D, R. 1681, 
Trial Tr. 73:4-9) Despite the fact that Jensens had to reduce their fees to 4 percent of 
collections in Payson, Plaintiff continued to demand payments based on a 6 percent rate, 
and the District Court erroneously held that the Defendants had failed to demonstrate any 
"economic injury" as the result of the breach. (Addendum C, R. 1640, CL 3.) 
In Utah, the law is well settled that a material breach by one party to a contract 
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excuses further performance by the nonbreaching party. See, e.g., Holbrook v. Master 
Protection Corp., 883 P.2d 295 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). Also, the Plaintiff, in seeking to 
enforce a contract, must prove performance of his own obligations under the contract. 
Bell v. Elder, 782 P.2d 545, 548 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). "Materiality" is "something 
which a buyer or seller of ordinary intelligence and prudence would think to be of some 
importance in determining whether to buy or sell." Hermansen v. Tasulis, 48 P.3d 235, 
242 (Utah 2002); Gohlerv. Wood, 919 P.2d 561, 564 (Utah 1996) (quoting S & F Supply 
Co. V. Hunter, 527 P.2d 217, 221 (Utah 1974). 
In this case, the question is whether the Defendants viewed the covenants made by 
the Plaintiff as of "some importance" in determining whether to enter into the Combined 
Agreement at all. The provisions of the Combined Agreement speak to this issue very 
clearly. For example, the consideration for the Plaintiffs covenant that he would "assist 
in the orderly transfer of all accounts to Jensens and assist Jensens to maintain the 
accounts over the life of the agreement" was for "commissions paid and profits shared" 
with the Plaintiff Orlob. (R. 50). A reasonable construction of this language is that the 
Plaintiff would not be entitled to any "commissions paid and profits shared" if he failed 
to honor that covenant. Obviously, any such failure on the part of Plaintiff could have 
the potential to seriously undermine the Plaintiffs business. Indeed, the Defendant 
refused even to introduce the Defendants to the physician clients of PCG or to advise 
those clients that the Jensens were the new owners of PCG, despite their repeated 
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requests that he do so. {Addendum C, R. 1635, FF 15.) Such a lack of cooperation with 
the Defendants is clearly a breach of the Defendants covenant to "assist in the orderly 
transfer of all accounts." Inexplicably, however, the Court below, while making a 
finding regarding the Plaintiffs unwillingness to take any steps to advise the physicians 
about the new ownership, failed to find that the Plaintiffs failures in this regard 
constituted a breach of the Combined Agreement. It is submitted that the Court erred in 
this respect, and that the Plaintiffs failure to honor his commitment, memorialized in the 
contract, to "assist in the orderly transfer of all accounts," was, at a minimum, of "some 
importance" to the Defendants and was a material breach of the contract. 
But even apart from the Plaintiffs failure to introduce current physician-clients to 
the new owners of the business, as found by the Court, the Defendant clearly violated his 
covenant to assist in the transfer and maintenance of accounts "to the extent that he did 
not introduce the Jensens to the Payson physicians." {Addendum C, R. 1640, CL 3.) 
This finding by the trial Court misses the most important continuing obligation of 
Plaintiff: the warranty and duty to maintain the accounts for the entire term of the 
agreement {Addendum A, Combined Agreement, R. 50, \ 5.) It was of negative value to 
Jensens to receive accounts on which they would lose money each month. 
Unfortunately, the Court went on to determine that this breach "was not sufficient to 
vitiate the obligation to make commission payments" to the Plaintiff. This finding is 
insupportable. Even Plaintiff admitted at trial that the Jensens would not make a profit at 
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less than 4 percent of collections. (Addendum D,R. 1681, Trial Tr. 71:3-9.) Plaintiff had 
provided a warranty that the accounts would be willing to pay 6 percent of collections 
"for services rendered." (Addendum A, Combined Agreement, |^ 8, R. 51.) The practical 
result of the Trial Court's rulings is (a) that the Jensens had to agree to a 4 percent fee in 
order to preserve the clients; (b) that the Jensens had to pay Orlob 1-1/2 percent, leaving 
Jensens a net of 2-1/2 percent on which they lose 1-1/2 percent on all such business; and 
(c) based on the Court's ruling, Orlob did not breach his warranty, despite the fact that 
the failure to honor the warranty and obligation to "maintain" these accounts caused 
substantial economic losses to Jensens each month. 
Under Utah law, whether the Plaintiffs breach was material depends only upon 
whether the Plaintiffs failure was of "some importance" to the Defendants. Clearly, it 
was, as demonstrated by the foregoing and this testimony of Defendant Steven Jensen: 
Q. Do you know how it was that Dr. Watson and Dr. 
Beatty found out that the contract had been purchased? 
A. I do not know. 
Q. So in approximately April of nineteen ninety, 
there's a reduction and you were telling us how it took 
place or what facilitated that. 
A. We had gone down to meet with Dr. Watson and Dr. 
Beatty with regards to this notification that they were 
leaving. And to introduce ourselves and gain some 
favor in their sight and try to save the account. They 
were a very important account because if you look back 
at when, at I think it's Exhibit Five? 
Q. Yes. 
A. And it shows their average monthly income, whereas 
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most of the physicians are nineteen, twenty, twenty-one 
thousand dollars, theirs is forty-five and forty-seven 
thousand dollars respectively. And they were at six 
percent still. They weren't part of the group that had 
negotiated a, the, from six to five percent. So they, 
so they were the last group of clients that we still 
had at six percent and they were our largest clients 
and so it would be, it would impact us dramatically to, 
to lose that account. And so we went down and got to 
know them, addressed their concerns. There was some 
things that we'd done, that we had done at our expense 
in helping them create, we provided some legal work and 
some accounting work to help them create an employee 
leasing company to lease their CNRA's and so we solved 
some of their problems and they agreed to maintain the 
billing but at four percent. Which was the rate that 
was being offered down in the Payson area. And so, you 
know, we wrote a letter to Mr. Orlob expressing that 
and, we did that, at, this whole process up and we're 
talking early ninety now, we've been involved a little 
over a year in this whole process and everything that 
could have gone wrong, went wrong. And at times it 
feels like, it seems like we're led to think that the 
Jensens got away with some additional money through 
this whole process. But in reducing the Payson 
contract from six percent to four percent and 
continuing to offer Mr. Orlob a half percent, now we 
were doing our largest client, very complicated client 
with an employee leasing company and paying payroll for 
CNRA's at three and half percent which was our break 
even point. We were earning nothing on our largest 
client now in trying to maintain the rapport in the 
valley amongst the clients and doing this literally 
without any help whatsoever from Mr. Orlob, contrary to 
what he promised to assist us to do throughout the life 
of this thing. And so that year was one of the most 
miserable years we could have ever experienced in that 
office of literally scrambling at every turn, 
regretting going into the officer every day, wondering 
what type of tantrum Mr. Orlob's going to throw coming 
out of his office or hiding or whether he's going to 
help us at all. Very negative period of time and now 
our largest client was reduced to a break even point 
for us. And we wrote him a letter and Mr. Orlob and I 
communicated, he was in California at this time, over 
the phone and his comments were "Whatever we have to 
do, we have to do." And he, he accepted his reduction. 
He continued to earn a half percent on that, of that 
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p o r t i o n of t h e accoun t and t h e J e n s e n s a t t h a t p o i n t , 
a t t h a t p o i n t were e a r n i n g n o t h i n g . 
(Addendum D,R. 1681, Trial Tr. 51:18 — 53:22) 
Given the importance of retaining the Payson physicians to the overall success of 
the Defendant's business, the Plaintiffs refusal to even introduce those physicians to the 
Defendants and the his inexplicable refusal to honor the obligation to "maintain" the 
accounts for the life of the agreement was a material breach by the Plaintiff, and excused 
any further performance by the Defendants. 
As noted above, the trial court also found that the Plaintiff breached his 
commitments under the contract with respect to Drs. Hamilton and Peterson. (Addendum 
C, R. 1639 - 40, CL 2, 4.) The court reached somewhat inconsistent conclusions, 
however, with respect to the Plaintiffs breaches of the contract as to those physicians. 
As to Dr. Peterson, the court concluded that the Defendants had "elected a fair and 
appropriate remedy" by reducing the commission payable to the Plaintiff in the sum of 
$803.93. As to Dr. Hamilton, while the court did not find any election of remedy on the 
part of the Defendants, the court concluded on its own that a further reduction in the 
commission payment was appropriate and such a reduction was made in the calculation 
of damages submitted by the Plaintiff and accepted by the court. 
But the court's resolution of this issue is misplaced. The issue is not whether the 
court can fashion some remedy to "correct" the Plaintiffs breaches of the contracts, but 
whether the Plaintiffs compliance with his covenants in the Combined Agreement were 
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of "some importance" to the Defendants such that his breach of those covenants is 
material, thus excusing their further performance under the contract. Even assuming that 
the Defendants "elected" a remedy with respect to Dr. Peterson, it is clear they did not do 
so with respect to Dr. Hamilton. Instead, without explanalion, the trial court simply 
imposes a remedy on them. When the breaches with respect to Drs. Peterson and 
Hamilton are considered in the light of the Plaintiffs other breaches of the contract, it is 
submitted that the Defendant's refusals 1o perform as specified in the Combined 
Agreement were material breaches which excused the Defendants' further performance. 
It is respectfully submitted that the District Court erred in concluding otherwise. 
Moreover, as shown above, the District Court did not even recognize the breach of failure 
to maintain the accounts as meriting a remedy, thus leaving the Jensens with a 
hemorrhage of red ink and with no remedy despite the warranties from the Plaintiff. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING THE 
PLAINTIFF PREJUDGMENT INTEREST ON THE 
AMOUNT OF THE JUDGMENT. 
Prejudgment interest may only be awarded to a party "in situations where the 
damage is complete, the loss can be measured by facts and figures, and the amount of the 
loss is fixed as of a particular time." Trail Mountain Coal Co. v. Utah Div. of State 
Lands and Forestry, 884 P.2d 1265, 1272 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). Where such certainty 
exists, courts should allow interest from the time when damages became fixed, rather 
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than from the date of the judgment. Id. Significantly, however, the time "when damages 
became fixed" is not determined by the hypothetical date payments may have became 
due, but only after a demand for payment has been made. Id.; see also Stoker v. 
Huntington Cleveland Irrigation Co., 664 P.2d 1188, 1191 (Utah 1983). As the Court 
noted in Trail Mountain, 
Trail Mountain was not on notice of the deficiency in payments — nor was 
any deficiency carried on the Division's books — until after the Division 
completed its audit. Only at that point did the Division demand payment of 
the allegedly underpaid royalty amounts. 
Trail Mountain at 1272. 
Consequently, prejudgment interest in Trail Mountain ran only from the date of 
that notice. In the instant case, there is no evidence that any demand for payment of the 
amounts allegedly due was made by the Plaintiff at any time. The Plaintiffs were not on 
notice of any deficiency in payments until after this Court reversed the Trial Court's 
initial determination that the sale of PCG's interest in the Combined Agreement 
extinguished any interest owned by the Plaintiff. Consequently, no award of 
prejudgment interest is appropriate in this case. 
Significantly, even the trial judge, in his ruling granting summary judgment to the 
Defendants, ruled that no sums were due to Orlob individually. Although that ruling was 
reversed by this Court, it demonstrates the legal uncertainty of any determination that any 
sums were due to the Plaintiff. 
Numerous cases hold that a court may award prejudgment interest only if damages are 
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calculable within a mathematical certainty. See, e.g., Lefavi v. Bertoch, 994 P.2d 817 
(Utah App. 2000). Thus, "prejudgment interest represents an amount awarded as 
damages due to the defendant's delay in tendering an amount clearly owing under an 
agreement or other obligation." Campbell, Maack & Sessions v. Debry, 38 P.2d 984 
(Utah Ct. App. 2001) (emphasis added). In the instant case, however, the Trial Court 
determined that the Plaintiff breached the Combined Agreement by competing with the 
defendants in violation of the terms of the agreement, and by failing to properly assist in 
the orderly transfer of physician contracts from his company to the defendants. Although 
the Court did not make a "finding" that there was a breach for refusal to "maintain" the 
transferred accounts, plaintiff, Orlob, testified that he did not do anything after the first 
six months to maintain the accounts. Thus, the defendants were entitled to some set-off 
from the amount the court found to be due and owing to the Plaintiff. The amount of the 
set-off to which the defendants are entitled was not determinable with mathematical 
certainty because, until the court ruled, it was unclear what would be the impact of the 
Plaintiffs numerous breaches of the Combined Agreement. Under these circumstances, 
because the damages, if any, due to the Plaintiff were not clearly ascertainable with 
mathematical certainty, no prejudgment mterest is appropriate and the trial court erred in 
awarding it to the Plaintiff. Moreover, the Court of Appeals in the earlier appeal in this 
case reversed the District Court's holding that the claim was owned 100 percent by the 
corporation and directed that David Orlob had a personal interest to some extent in the 
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claim. Until the District Court concluded that the individual interest owned by Orlob was 
50 percent (which we believe is wrong as hereinafter briefed), there was no way to do 
any calculations with the "mathematical certainty" required. As the Court of Appeals 
determined in the DeBry case, supra, the amount of damages must be "clearly owing 
under an agreement." (Emphasis added.) Here, given the Plaintiffs breaches of the 
agreement and absolute uncertainty as to the percentage of ownership of any outstanding 
claims, no amount of the alleged damages was "clearly owing" under the Combined 
Agreement. 
This is another way of saying that there are no "liquidated damages" which may 
be subject to a claim for prejudgment interest. In Lefavi v. Bertoch, 994 P.2d 817, 822 
(Utah Ct. App. 2000), the Court notes that "prejudgment interest is awarded 'to 
compensate a party for the depreciating value of the amount owed over time and, as a 
corollary, [to] deter [ ] parties from intentionally withholding an amount that is liquidated 
and owing.'" There was no liquidated damages provision in the parties' Combined 
Agreement. Such a provision could have insured that any damages suffered by a party as 
the result of breach by the other party would be subject to a damages calculation 
determined with mathematical precision. In the instant case, however, because of the 
necessity for the Court to determine the effect of the plaintiffs breaches of the agreement 
and determination of the applicable percentage of ownership of the claims, no such 
calculation could properly be made. Thus, the award of prejudgment interest was not 
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appropriate in this case. 
As the Court in Lafavi also noted, 
For damages to be calculable with mathematical certainty, as required to 
award prejudgment interest, they must be ascertained in accordance with 
fixed rules of evidence and known standards of value, which the court or 
jury must follow in fixing the amount rather than be guided by their best 
judgment in assessing the amount to be allowed for past as well as for 
future injury, or for elements that cannot be measured by any fixed 
standards of value. 
Lafavi at 817. 
See also Cornia v. Wilcox, 898 P.2d 1379 (Utah 1995); Dejavu, Inc. v. U.S. Energy 
Corp., 993 P.2d 222 (Utah Ct. App. 1999); Coalville City v. Lundgren, 930 P.2d 1206 
(Utah Ct.App. 1997). 
V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO 
RECOGNIZE THAT THE PLAINTIFF' S 
WARRANTY REGARDING 6 PERCENT OF 
COLLECTIONS EXTENDED TO THE END OF THE 
CONTRACT PERIOD. 
In the Combined Agreement, the parties agreed that "Orlob," — considered 
collectively as PCG and the Plaintiff Orlob — would be entitled to a commission for six 
years calculated at 1-1/2 percent of the average for the past 12 months' collections (to be 
reduced to 1 percent for the final year). {Addendum A, Combined Agreement, R. 50 - 51, 
TJ8.) In the same paragraph 8, calling for payments based on the 1-1/2 percent calculation 
for six years, "Orlob" provided a warranty certifying that the listed accounts "must be 
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willing to pay 6 percent of total collections for services rendered." The Trial Court held 
that this warranty applied only to the moment the contract was entered into. (Addendum 
E, R. 1682, Trial Tr. 156:2-10.) However, the Trial Court made this ruling on the basis 
of no evidence presented at trial and no guidance contained in the Combined Agreement. 
{Addendum A; Addendum C, R. 1639, FF No. 23.) The Court did not base its ruling on 
any finding as to the intention of the parties based upon the Combined Agreement or any 
other factors in evidence at trial. The Defendants have carefully examined the complete 
record in this case, and have located no evidence in any form from which it could be 
concluded as a factual matter that Orlob's ownership interest in the commissions payable 
under the Combined Agreement is 50 percent. 
As to the Plaintiffs warranty that physicians would be willing to pay a 6 percent 
commission "for services rendered" {Addendum A, Combined Agreement, R. 51), the 
District Court concluded as follows: 
I think from my understanding of the nature of the contracts that the, 
that they were with physicians who are certainly persons of 
independent mind and, and some sophistication of their own, with 
thirty day and ninety day terminations provisions, it's clear that the, 
that the these billing contracts had no way of controlling doctors or 
requiring that the doctors continue to do business a certain way for a 
certain price. Also to me, it's painfully naive to assume that those 
doctors are going to accept a six percent contract from the same 
people that offered them four percent. 
{Addendum E, R. 1682, Trial Tr. 154:25 — 155:10.) 
Although the Trial Court's reasoning that the doctors would resist paying 6 
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percent when other Jensen clients were paying 4 percent seems sound as a matter of 
logic, the legal conclusion that the 6 percent warranty was only designed for one moment 
in time is not sound. This is made clear from the language of the Combined Agreement 
itself, which requires that Orlob warrant "that all listed anesthesiologists accounts must 
be willing to pay 6% of total collections for services rendered." {Addendum A, 
Combined Agreement, % 8, R. 51.) Thus, to whatever extent the Defendants render 
billing services to those physicians, the Plaintiff Orlob has warranted that they will pay a 
commission of 6 percent, and not some other, lesser amount. That Orlob may have been 
"painfully naive" in assuming that the physicians would be continuously willing to pay 
the higher commission should in no way vitiate the warranty he freely adopted. As the 
Utah Supreme Court has stated, "We have often observed in our case law that a court will 
neither make a better contract for the parties than they have made for themselves nor 
enforce asserted rights not supported by the contract itself" Jensen v. Redevelopment 
Agency, 951 P.2d 735, 737 (Utah 1997). See also Hal Taylor Assocs. v. UnionAmerica, 
Inc., 657 P.2d 743, 749 (Utah 1982) ("It is a long-standing rule in Utah that persons 
dealing at arm's length are entitled to contract on their own terms without the 
intervention of the courts to relieve either party from the effects of a bad bargain.") 
The Defendants' argument that the 6 percent warranty covered the life of the 
Combined Agreement is also based on the following facts from the record: 
1. All parties were aware that Defendants were contracting at 4 percent while the 
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Plaintiff was contracting at 6 percent. (See, e.g., Addendum Z), R. 1681, Trial Tr. 
45:4-17; 56:6-10; 75:14-25 — 76:1-7.) 
2. All parties knew that 4 percent was the lowest commission rate possible without 
losing money. Plaintiff Orlob testified as follows: 
Q. (by Orlob5s counsel) What did you do after you found out that a 
competitor was coming into Salt Lake offering a cut rate? 
A. (by Mr. Orlob) I knew they couldn't operate at that rate for long. I went 
through my records and I looked to see what would happen if we reduced 
our rate to that and it would basically reduce the profit of the company to 
zero. So I knew they couldn't operate at that rate for very long. 
(Addendum D, R. 1681, Trial Tr. 73:3-9.) 
3. Given the above, all parties also knew that paying Plaintiff a commission based on 
1 Vi percent of collections was only economically feasible if the physician 
accounts were paying least a 5 Vi percent commission to the Defendants. 
4. Some of the Plaintiffs clients were already transferring their business to the 
Defendants at the lower rate, as the Trial Court found. (R. 1633, Addendum C, FF 
6,7.) 
5. The 6 percent warranty was with respect to the assigned physician "accounts". 
The word "accounts" appears several times in the Combined Agreement in context 
that gives meaning to the extent of the warranty period. For example, paragraph 5 
of the Combined Agreement states: 
For commissions paid and profits shared Orlob warrants that he will assist 
in the orderly transfer of all accounts to Jensens and assist Jensens to 
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maintain the accounts over the life of the agreement. 
(Addendum A, Combined Agreement, R. 50) (Emphasis added.) 
Paragraph 8 states in pertinent part: 
For Orlob's assistance in the transfer and maintenance of accounts listed on 
schedule "B"....Orlob warrants that all listed anesthesiologists accounts 
must be willing to pay 6% of total collections^^ services rendered. 
(Addendum A, Combined Agreement, R. 51) (Emphasis added.) 
Thus, the Combined Agreement representing the only written agreement of the 
parties in this case, provides two warranties with respect to the "accounts." First, Orlob 
warrants he will "maintain" the "accounts" over the life of the agreement (paragraph 5); 
second, Orlob warrants that the "accounts" must be willing to pay 6 percent of collections 
(paragraph 8). This warranty of 6 percent is in the same paragraph 8 which provides that 
Orlob is to receive commissions for "transferring and maintaining the accounts," which 
in paragraph 5 of the Combined Agreement Orlob warrants he will maintain over the life 
of the agreement. The warranty of "maintenance" of the accounts is meaningless if the 
physician who control those accounts are able to materially and unilaterally reduce their 
payable commissions. A reduction from six to four percent is clearly a material change 
in the parties' understanding. Also, the language in the Combined Agreement expressly 
uses the future tense in requiring that the physician "accounts must be willing" to pay the 
six percent commission. The language cannot reasonably be read to suggest only a 
present warranty on behalf of Orlob that the contracts will be merely delivered at six 
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percent, because the physician accounts were already paying at that rate as of the date the 
Combined Agreement was executed. Moreover, as noted above, the Defendants would 
be economically unable to pay VA percent of collections to the Plaintiff if the total 
commissions paid to the Defendants meant they lost money on the transactions. These 
realities under the Combined Agreement demonstrate that the Plaintiffs warranty 
guaranteeing six percent commissions must have been intended by the parties to extend 
over the life of the contract. 
The Plaintiff was already losing clients to the Defendants and more were on the 
way out. Before long, the economic advantages to physicians would cause most or all of 
the Plaintiffs accounts to transfer their business to the Defendants, unless the Plaintiff 
reduced his fees to match the competition. The Defendants would not contract to pay 1 
lA percent to the Plaintiff unless it made economic sense, and the 6 percent warranty 
made economic sense to both parties. This is because the Defendants would earn 4 lA 
percent — or half a percent more than on other business — and Plaintiff could still make 
his 1 lA percent profit, assuming he "maintained" the accounts effectively. Even if the 
payable commissions were reduced to 5 percent, the Plaintiff could still make some 
money if he honored his warranty and maintained the accounts at five percent. 
The 6 percent warranty also provided that payment at that rate would be for 
"services rendered." This phrase has meaning only for the provision of future services 
performed by the parties. It is not a reasonable construction of the Combined Agreement 
44 
to determine that the warranty only applies at the moment of contracting, since "services 
rendered" plainly has reference to such services to be performed in the future. No 
services would be rendered at the moment of contracting the Combined Agreement. All 
services would be rendered in the future. 
Based on the foregoing, the Trial Court's erred in holding that the warranty did 
not apply to future payments made by physicians pursuant to their contracts with PCG. It 
is submitted that the judgment below should be overturned as a matter of contract 
construction. As a matter of Utah law, the error becomes even clearer. The Trial Court 
expressed the concern that, because of the short term nature of the contracts with the 
physicians, Orlob could not control their decisions in the future. The Court also 
suggested and that the doctors would try to get the same rate being paid by the 
Defendants other clients. It appears to have been these concerns that led the Court to 
conclude that the warranty was for only a single snapshot in time — the moment at which 
the parties entered into their Combined Agreement. 
Such reasoning flies in the face of the concept of a "warranty." People can and 
do warrant future occurrences which may or may not occur; but if a warranty is 
materially breached, the non-breaching party will be excused from further performance. 
The fact that the representations claimed were that defendants would 
arrange the occurrence of future events does not indicate that there was not 
a warranty. A person may warrant the occurrence of future events or of 
events which could not possibly happen. The substance of such a warranty 
is in effect a promise to respond in damages proximately caused by the 
nonexistence of a represented fact, or the failure of a promised event to 
45 
occur. A warranty is unlike a fraudulent misrepresentation, for it may rest 
on a promise that a specified event or events will happen in the future, or 
even that events which cannot possibly happen will occur. Recovery for 
breach of warranty does not require that the person making the 
representation or promise be aware that it is false. It is sufficient if there is 
a misrepresentation of an existing fact or a promise that a specified event 
will occur in the future, if such representation or promise has a natural 
tendency to induce another in reliance thereon to purchase, sell or exchange 
his property. 
Welchman v. Wood, 353 P. 2d 165 (Utah 1960). (Emphasis added.) 
The nature of warranty is to indemnify the other party if the warranted fact does 
not occur. In the instant case, the Plaintiff warranted that the physician accounts would 
be willing to pay 6 percent of collections for services rendered. That the accounts 
refused to do so after a brief time does excuse the Plaintiffs failure to warrant the 
commission rate — it means that the Plaintiff must honor his commitment. 
A warranty is an assurance by one party to a contract of the 
existence of a fact upon which the other party may rely. It is 
intended to relieve the promisee of any duty to ascertain the fact for 
himself, and it amounts to a promise to answer in damages for any 
injury proximately caused if the fact warranted proves untrue. 
Quagliana v. Exquisite Home Builders, Inc., 538 P.2d 301, 309 
(Utah 1975); Welchman v. Wood, 10 Utah 2d 325, 328, 353 P.2d 
165, 167(1960). 
Groen v. Tri-O-Inc, 667 P.2d 598, 604 (Utah 1983). 
Application of fundamental principals of warranty law demonstrate that the Trial 
Court's concern about whether the physicians would be willing to pay 6 percent over 
time was misplaced. The warranty was given and should be enforced as written. 
The Plaintiffs own intentions about longevity of the 6 percent warranty are 
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revealed tellingly by his own testimony. In answer to a question by the Court regarding 
Orlob's desire to introduce the Defendants as new members of management — rather 
than truthfully, as new owners — the Plaintiff Orlob stated: 
Well, like I said, the problem with that was they had approached 
these doctors at four percent. My concern was making sure things 
didn't get disruptive and making sure that doctors, like Dr. Shuput, 
didn't go hey, what's the deal here. I had four percent three months 
ago and now I'm stuck at six. My intent was to keep the six percent 
as a viable number." 
(AddendumD,R. 1681, Trial Tr. 122:13-19.) 
In answer to another question by the Trial Court on the same subject, the Plaintiff 
Orlob stated: "It was my intent that we make a smooth transition. And whatever it took 
to make that happen so that the client stayed at six percent was critical to me and the 
Jensens." (Addendum E, R. 1682, Trial Tr. 129:17-19.) 
If the warranty was only to apply to the day the contract was signed and his 1 lA 
percent commission was to be unaffected by whether or not the transferred accounts paid 
6 percent, Mr. Orlob would not have been concerned about keeping "the six percent as a 
viable number" and "keeping clients at six percent" would not have been critical to him. 
The very reason "keeping clients at six percent" was critical to Orlob is that he himself 
guaranteed that rate in the Combined Agreement. (Addendum A, R. 51.) The 
contractual language within the four corners of this integrated agreement, the plaintiffs 
own testimony, and the Utah law related to warranties — all these support the 
Defendants' position that the warranty extended for the life of the Combined Agreement. 
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The Trial Court's decision to the contrary should be reversed. 
VI. THE TRIAL COURT'S FACTUAL DETERMINATION 
AWARDING THE PLAINTIFF 50 PERCENT OF THE 
COMMISSIONS OTHERWISE PAYABLE TO THE 
PLAINTIFF IS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS. BASED 
UPON THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BELOW, THE 
COURT SHOULD HAVE DETERMINED THAT ANY 
REMAINING INTEREST IN THE COMBINED 
AGREEMENT WAS OWNED SOLELY BY PCG, AND 
NOT BY THE PLAINTIFF ORLOB IN ANY 
INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY. 
In an earlier appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the summary judgment ruling 
of the District Court that commissions otherwise payable under the Combined Agreement 
were owned 100 percent by PCG, and that the Plaintiff, personally, had a continuing 
interest in those payments based upon two personal obligations contained in the 
Combined Agreement: (1) the duty to assist in the transfer and maintenance of the 
accounts; and (2) the non-competition agreement. The Court of Appeals remanded to 
enable the District Court to determine the extent of the ownership interest of Orlob in 
PCG. Orlob v. Wasatch Management, 33 P.3d 1078, 1082 (Utah Ct. App. 2001). On 
remand, the District Court found as a fact as follows: 
The Combined Agreement itself, does not state whether or how the 
commission payment should be divided between PCG and David L. Orlob, 
individually. Absent any instruction in the Combined Agreement, the 
Court finds that the commission payments go one-half, or 50%, to PCG and 
one-half, or 50%, to Orlob, individually. 
{Addendum C, Finding of Fact No. 23, R. 1639.) 
Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) requires that "[a] party challenging a fact finding must 
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first marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged finding." In this case, 
however, the Defendants have located no evidence in the record whatsoever supporting 
the District Court's finding. There is, literally, no evidence to marshal. No witness at 
trial testified the ownership interest between Orlob and PCG should be divided fifty-fifty; 
and no document introduced at trial made any such allocation. Where there is no such 
evidence in support of a factual finding, that finding is clearly erroneous as a matter of 
law.4 See, e.g., Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co., 918 P.2d 461, 468 (Utah 1996); 
Larson v. Larson, 888 P.2d 719, 724-25 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
In ruling on the issue of the relative interests in the Combined Agreement, the 
District Court stated, in pertinent part: 
In looking at those items that the court of appeals recognize, provided that 
Orlob had an interest, it had to do with his willingness to make an orderly 
transition and his willingness to not compete. As a matter of determining 
what has happened in this case, I've found that Mr. Orlob has breached 
both of those covenants, though he has complied with parts of them as well. 
His breach hasn't been total and wouldn't eliminate his right to any 
compensation . . . . But I think it is somewhat instructive that 
notwithstanding the fact that in terms of Mr. Orlob's really failure to do 
much of anything to support in the transition other than what would be the 
mechanical features that clearly he did do, that the contract had the value 
that it had but the parties had to have made substantial accommodations to 
reduce their, to reduce the amount of commissions they're entitled to in 
order to maintain the contract. . . . I've looked at the evidence as best I can 
and as I look at it the best allocation that I can determine is, in effect, that 
the ongoing business that was transferred, I deem to be valued at fifty 
4The only possible theory for the Court's factual finding is that, as there are two claimants 
to the ownership of an interest in the Combined Agreement, the total interest should be 
arbitrarily divided equally between the two possible claimants. As set forth infra, such an 
equal distribution of the ownership interests is not tenable given the facts of this case. 
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percent and the participation that Orlob was to do in the transition and not 
competing was fifty percent. I can't come up with a better allocation so 
that is my finding and my determination on how this should weigh up. 
(Addendum F, R. 1683, Trial Tr. 38:24-25—40:1-5.) 
The Plaintiff Orlob, who brought this case and was the sole owner of PCG, has the 
burden of proof on this issue. See, e.g., Loose v. Nature-All Corp., 785 P.2d 1096 (Utah 
1989); Olwell c. Clark, 658 P.2d 585 (Utah 1982); Johnson v. Garkane Power Ass n, 646 
P.2d 744, 745 (Utah 1982); Yost v. State, 640 P.2d 1044, 1048 (Utah 1981) ("It is 
axiomatic that a plaintiff cannot meet its burden of proof by speculation."); Burns v. 
Cannondale Bicycle Co., 876 P.2d 415, 418 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); Kitchen v. Cal Gas 
Co., Inc., 821 P.2d 48 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). The Plaintiff offered no evidence in support 
of the fifty-fifty allocation of ownership of amounts payable under the Combined 
Agreement, and there is no other evidence in the record justifying such an allocation. 
The Court's factual finding is thus clearly erroneous and must be reversed. 
It is submitted, however, that the factual evidence contained in the record fully 
supports the view that the Plaintiff Orlob had no effective ownership interest of the 
amounts payable pursuant to the Combined Agreement, even apart from the IRS sale of 
PCG's interest to the Defendants. In the prior appeal, this Court held that whatever 
interest the Plaintiff Orlob owned "arises from the personal covenants he made to assist 
in with the orderly transfer and maintenance of accounts and not to compete with 
Wasatch and the Jensens." Orlob v. Wasatch Management, 33 P.3d 1078, 1082 (Utah Ct. 
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percent and the participation that Orlob was to do in the transition and not 
competing was fifty percent. I can't come up with a better allocation so 
that is my finding and my determination on how this should weigh up. 
(Addendum F, R. 1683, Trial Tr. 38:24-25 — 40:1-5.) 
The Plaintiff Orlob, who brought this case and was Ihe sole owner of PCG, has the 
burden of proof on this issue. See, e.g., Loose v. Nature-All Corp., 785 P.2d 1096 (Utah 
1989); Olwell c. Clark, 658 P.2d 585 (Utah 1982); Johnson v. Garkane Power Ass n, 646 
P.2d 744, 745 (Utah 1982); Yost v. State, 640 P.2d 1044, 1048 (Utah 1981) ("It is 
axiomatic that a plaintiff cannot meet its burden of proof by speculation."); Burns v. 
Cannondale Bicycle Co., 876 P.2d 415, 418 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); Kitchen v. Cal Gas 
Co., Inc., 821 P.2d 48 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). The Plaintiff offered no evidence in support 
of the fifty-fifty allocation of ownership of amounts payable under the Combined 
Agreement, and there is no other evidence in the record justifying such an allocation. 
The Court's factual finding is thus clearly erroneous and must be reversed. 
It is submitted, however, that the factual evidence contained in the record fully 
supports the view that the Plaintiff Orlob had no effective ownership interest of the 
amounts payable pursuant to the Combined Agreement, even apart from the IRS sale of 
PCG's interest to the Defendants. In the prior appeal, this Court held that whatever 
interest the Plaintiff Orlob owned "arises from the personal covenants he made to assist 
in with the orderly transfer and maintenance of accounts and not to compete with 
Wasatch and the Jensens." Orlob v. Wasatch Management, 33 P.3d 1078, 1082 (Utah Ct. 
50 
App. 2001). The Court also noted it did "not address what percentages of interest Orlob 
and PCG had in the Combined Agreement, nor do we address whether Orlob breached 
the Combined Agreement." Id. Obviously, these two issues are interrelated because, if 
Orlob breached the agreement, as the District Court found, and the breach was material, 
further performance under the Combined Agreement by the Defendants is not required, 
even assuming some technical ownership interest in the Agreement, (See the discussion, 
supra, at pp. 28-35 and 39-37.) Additionally, the Plaintiffs own testimony established 
that the covenant not to compete contained in the Combined Agreement had no value to 
him. {Addendum EPR.1682, Trial Tr. 128:20 -129:4.) The lack of any value in the 
covenant not to compete arose largely from the fact that the non-compete clause was 
limited to conducting a competitive business in Utah (Addendum A, Combined 
Agreement, R. 50) and the Plaintiff Orlob moved to California soon after his sale of the 
business to the Defendants herein, (Addendum E, R, 1682, Trial Tr. H8:9-18.) Even 
assuming the non-compete clause had value to the Plaintiff, as found by the District 
Court the Plaintiff breached that clause by competing with the Defendants and arranging 
for his associate to perform billing services for Dr. Peterson. (Addendum C, R. 1637, FF 
No. 18.) The Court misapplied the legal standard in determining that, because the 
Plaintiffs breach was not "total/7 the Plaintiffs breaches of the Combined Agreement 
"wouldn't eliminate his right to any compensation." (Addendum F, R> 1683, Trial Tr. 
39:5-6.) As noted above, a breach need not be "total** in order to excuse an opposing 
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party's further performance under a contract. Rather, the issue is whether a buyer or 
seller of ordinary intelligence and prudence would think the breach of the covenant to be 
of some importance in determining whether to buy or sell." Hermansen v. Tasulis, 48 
P.3d 235, 242 (Utah 2002). For the reasons set forth above, it is clear that the Plaintiffs 
breach of non-compete clause of the Combined Agreement was, at the very least, "of 
some importance" to the Defendants. 
Nor can any value properly be assigned to the Plaintiffs warranty to assist with 
the orderly transfer and maintenance of accounts, inasmuch as the Plaintiff utterly failed 
to act in accordance with his warranty. Indeed, as found by the District Court, the 
Plaintiff Orlob went so far as to refuse to introduce the Jensens to the new owners of the 
company, despite their repeated requests. {Addendum C, R. 1635, FF No. 15.) 
Additionally, within the first six months after the execution of the Combined Agreement, 
the Plaintiff stopped performing any services in maintaining the accounts at all. 
(Addendum D, R. 1681, Trial Tr. 76:4-6; 81:18-21; 136:21-25 — 137:1-21.) Finally, the 
District Court found that 
not withstanding the fact that in terms of Mr. Orlob's really failure 
to do much of anything to support in the transition other than what 
would be the mechanical features that clearly he did do, that the 
contract had the value that it had but that the parties had to have 
made substantial accommodations to reduce their, to reduce the 
amount of commissions they're entitled to in order to maintain the 
contract. 
(Addendum F, R. 1683, Trial Tr. 39:10-16.) 
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The need for the Defendants herein to make "substantial accommodations . . . to 
reduce the amount of commissions" arose entirely because of the Plaintiffs clear 
violation of his warranty to guarantee that his physician accounts would pay a six percent 
commission over the life of the contract (see discussion, supra, pp. 39-47). The result 
was lost revenues which would not have occurred but for the Plaintiffs own conduct. 
Thus, because the Plaintiffs non-compete covenant had little or no value and was not 
honored by him; because his duty to assist in the orderly transfer and maintenance of 
accounts had no value and was not honored by him; and because he failed to honor his 
warranty that physicians would continue to pay a 6 percent commission, it is respectfully 
submitted that the Plaintiffs ownership interest in the physician accounts under the 
Combined Agreement was essentially non-existent and the findings of the District Court 
should properly have resulted in a determination that the Plaintiff had no interest in the 
Combined Agreement. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, it is submitted that the judgment of the District Court 
should be reversed; and this Court should determine (1) that the Plaintiff has no standing 
to raise his claims in the District Court in light of his failures to disclose his claims in his 
bankruptcy proceeding; (2) that the District Court erred in applying the Statute of Frauds 
in refusing to consider the parties5 oral modifications to the Combined Agreement; (3) 
that the District Court erred in failing to determine that the Plaintiffs various breaches of 
the Combined Agreement were material and thus excused the Defendants from any 
further performance under the that Agreement; (4) that the District Court erred in 
awarding prejudgment interest; (5) that the District Court erred in refusing to recognize 
the Plaintiffs warranty to deliver physician accounts to the Defendants at a commission 
of 6 percent over the life of the Combined Agreement; and (6) that the District Court's 
factual finding that the Plaintiff owned a fifty percent interest in the Combined 
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Agreement is clearly erroneous, and that under the facts of this case, the Plaintiff owned 
no interest in that agreement. 
DATED this 13th day of September, 2004. 
James C. Haskihs 
Attorney for Defendants 
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